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COMMENT
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EMPLOYED INVENTOR
JOHN C. STEDMANt

Recent legal developments relating to the employed inventor can be
summed up in three words: Nothing has happened. It is not suggested
that this situation is of no significance. Like the dog that did not bark in
a Sherlock Holmes story, it may be very significant.
There was a time when if you made a better mousetrap the world
would beat a path to your door-at least that is how the copybook had it.
Invention was an intensely personal matter, an individual triumph. In
contrast to the happenings in the biological world, when an idea was
born, there may have been some speculation as to who the mother was
(necessity?), but there was no doubt as to the father. This is reflected in
our patent law' which requires that we name the real father in the birth
certificate and assumes our ability to do so. And whatever pain and
expense attended the creation and upbringing of this brain-child, it more
than paid you back upon reaching maturity.
Today, finding the real father has become more complex: A dozen
other co-employees in the research laboratory, past employees who left
memoranda in the files describing their work on mousetraps, the advertising department, the sales department, the patent department, the
employer who makes out your salary check, the Federal Government
which provides the wherewithal that keeps that check from bouncing, and
even the IBM 3600, or whatever number it is, that swallows and regurgitates all sorts of spoon-fed data, all are part of the picture. As for
the inventor, the putative father of the idea, he may be pretty far down the
totem pole. Maybe his image is not even carved on it. And when it comes
to cashing in on the invention, reaping its rewards, he may be as far removed as was his great-great-grandfather from whom some unprincipled
tycoon stole his marvelous invention of the wheel and made a million
dollars on it.
The picture has been overdrawn, of course. It was never this stark,
either in the old days or in modern times. Many employed inventors in
rhe past received weekly wages for their efforts, leaving the speculative
reward that might or might not be derived from their inventions to their

' Professor of Law, Univ. of Wisconsin.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1952).

EMPLOYED INVENTOR
employers. Inventors today, whether employed or independent, in many
cases receive appropriate recognition and material reward for their contributions. The fact remains, however, that we do operate under a system
that looks in two directions. On the one hand, it recognizes the intensely
personal nature of the inventive act and the importance of providing encouragement and stimulus to the inventor. On the other hand, we develop
a structure operating to a considerable extent through the patent system
wherein both the stimulus to invent and the reward that flows therefrom
connect only remotely and indirectly at best with the employee. Sometimes the connection is severed completely.
These possibilities, and to a considerable extent realities, have been
with us for a long time. The problem today is three-pronged. First, a
single inventor increasingly becomes only a part, sometimes a small part,
in the overall invention and innovation process, and increasingly it
becomes impractical for him to exploit the invention.2 Second, the interposition between the inventor and the reward of the employer as
beneficial owner of the invention has become more and more common as
the "inventive process" becomes more and more the collective project of
the research laboratory instead of the identifiable work of one or two
individuals.' The inventive activity is increasingly supported and subsidized by corporations or government rather than by the inventor himself, and the cost of making and exploiting the invention continues to
mount. Third, we have increasingly accorded to technological development a "public interest" status that impels us to maximize our efforts to
invent and to realize upon the results of these efforts.4 And so, it behooves us to re-examine our legal institutions-institutions that have
changed little despite the changes in the status of the employed inventor.
Are these legal institutions contributing what they should to accomplish
these presumably salutary results? Can they be made to contribute more?
THE LAW GOVERNING THE PRIVATELY EMPLOYED INVENTOR
We may begin by concentrating on the "allocation" between employer
and employee of the rights in employee-originated inventions and pass
over the various other rights and duties that are not of central concern
to our discussion which exist in the employer-employee relationship, such
as the employer's duty to give proper credit to employees for their con2. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PANEL ON INVENTION AND INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: ITS ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGE' ENT 8-11 (1967).
3. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS ISSUED TO CORPORATIONS, 1939-

55 (Study of S. Res. 167 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
of the Committee on the judiciary, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1956)).
4. ECONOMIC
(1964) ; V. BUSH,

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tributions and the employee's duty to cooperate in applying for patents.
The basic law controlling the allocation of rights between the
employed-inventor and his employer stems from two sources: the common
law, including shop-right doctrine and the law of contracts.5 Although
complex and controversial issues can arise in both areas, the underlying
laws and their principles are fairly simple.
Under "shop-right" and related law the rights to an invention
divide in three ways, depending upon the status of the employee and the
circumstances surrounding his inventive activity.6 If the employee makes
the invention independently of his job, on his own time, with his own
facilities and equipment, and without help from his employer or assistance
from co-employees, the invention belongs to him just as though he had
been operating independently. At the other extreme, if he is "hired to
invent," for example to conduct the research that led to the invention, the
invention belongs to the employer just as the Chevrolet assembled by a
General Motors employee belongs to General Motors. In between these
extremes is the "shop-right." It relates to inventions made by an employee
not hired to invent, but nevertheless made by him on company time or
involving use of company facilities, equipment, information and ideas,
assistance from other employees-in other words, inventions to which the
employer has contributed substantially in one respect or another. In
these circumstances, the law dictates that the invention shall belong to the
employee but that the employer shall have a free, non-exclusive, nonassignable (except with the transfer of the business itself) license to use
the invention in his business.
The legal bases for this doctrine vary.' Some courts profess to find
a relational status based upon trust and confidence, the master-servant
relationship, and related doctrines. Some courts bottom their conclusions
upon implied contract, while others apply a quantum meruit doctrine, or a
doctrine of estoppel, or concepts of equity and fair dealing. Regardless of
the theory, however, it appears that they all come out pretty much the
same in the final analysis.
This scheme like much of our law appears to work reasonably well
in the nice, neat, orderly cases. But it has its shortcomings. The employee
who makes the inventions he was hired and paid to make should turn
over these inventions to the employer; he should preserve in confidence
valuable information that was disclosed to him in confidence; he should
cooperate in helping his employer obtain patents on what he has done. To
5. J. COSTA, LAW OF INVENTING IN EMPLOYMENT (1953).
6. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 356 (1958).
7. Morris, Patent Rights in an Employee's Invention: The Anmerican Shop Right
Rule and the English View, 75 L. QUAR. REV. 483 (1959).
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so hold accords with our sense of fairness and corresponds with what the
parties presumably intended or would have agreed upon had they thought
about it. Conversely, inventions that were entirely the handiwork
of the employee, to which the employer contributed nothing in
released time, or in equipment, assistance or suggestion, should belong
entirely to the employee and it does not shock us for the law to say so.
Most of the trouble comes in the gray areas, typically the "shopright" area. Here, the courts purport to find intent where there was none,
estoppel where the employee has done nothing to prejudice the interests
of the employer, implied contracts as to matters that never entered the
heads of the parties. In the name of equity and fairness, the courts
render Solomonic judgments, wielding a butcher's cleaver with reckless abandon. Thus, the employer's shop-right in a given invention
may be of tremendous value, of only limited value, or of no value at all,
depending on the nature and scope of the employer's business in relation
to the invention. He may receive a right of great value for a very slight
contribution of something of little value despite a very substantial contribution. The employee may nullify a potentially valuable shop-right by
simply not enforcing his patent, by not patenting at all, or by granting licenses to others on favorable terms. It is all very haphazard-at least to
the extent that the parties are disposed to stand on their legal rights. To
the extent that rights in the inventions or quasi-inventions take the form
of trade secrets, the shop-right doctrine becomes unworkable.
It is true that some flexibility and discretion lies with the court in
dealing with such elusive issues as intent, the nature and extent of
employer contribution, the nature of the employment, and how extensive
the shop-right should be.' There is also some flexibility in the legal
doctrine itself. Some courts award a shop-right only in areas related to the
inventor's employment; others award it for the employer's entire business
(a doctrine that of course gives great advantages to the large, diversified
concern as compared to the small specialty company). But this flexibility
is limited at best.
Basically the choice is often forced between three alternatives-no
rights in the employer, entire rights in the employer, or a royalty-free
non-exclusive license to the employer-in circumstances where no one of
these alternatives accurately reflects either the intent of the parties or the
equities of the situation. The Procrustean approach to problems does, of
course, have the virtue of easy administrability, but it hardly reflects
the ideals to which the law aspires in its finer moments.
8. Workman, Rights of Employers and Employees in Inventions Made by the Latter, 20 A.B.A.J. 538 (1934).
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With these shortcomings, it is not surprising that employers have
increasingly resorted to contract in allocating invention rights.' Employee-invention contracts have become more and more common over the
years. But while freedom of contract has been one of the basic principles
underlying our economic, commercial and industrial system, application
in the area under discussion poses three major problems.
First, "freedom of contract" concepts are bottomed upon genuine
equality of bargaining power. But employees and employers are often not
on an equal footing. It is true that research employees are likely to be
more favorably positioned than many other types of employees-and
employers argue strenuously that the opportunities for employment elsewhere give such individuals a strong bargaining position. However, it
remains an open question to what extent the employees who are required
by contract to convey rights in inventions they make have freedom to
bargain over the terms of such contracts. The uniform provisions that
characterize such employment contracts"0 and the sweeping and often
arbitrary terms favorable to the employer that they contain-terms that
often give rise to expressions of dissatisfaction and resentment-suggest
that the bargaining that may take place occurs mainly with respect to
salary rather than to the allocation of rights-and even as to salary it
may be only a select few who can do other than take what is offered
them. One may question, consequently, whether the employees who are
subjected to such contracts are quite as far removed as is sometimes
supposed from the ordinary employees for whom, experience has shown,
the traditional processes of individual bargaining and contracting have
not proven satisfactory. For the ordinary employee, resort to union
representation and collective bargaining has been the result. Neither of
these devices is used to any significant degree in the area of employment
for research."
A second factor that poses problems is the tendency of many
employers to impose conditions that hamper the employee in obtaining
subsequent employment elsewhere and provide the employer with undue
advantages and arbitrary conditions vis-i-vis his competitors. Included
are the so-called "trailer clauses" that require assignment by the employee
of inventions completed after employment has terminated, impose restrictions upon his use or disclosure of confidential information received
in the course of employment, and restrict his post-employment activities
9.

O'Meara, Employee Patent and Secrecy Agreements, N.I.C.B.

SONNEL POLICY No. 199

10.

STUDY IN PER-

(1965).

Id.

11. F.
manuscript).

NEUMEYER,

THE EMPLOYED INVENTOR IN THE UNITED STATES

(unpublished
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to the extent that they may be competitively detrimental to the employer.:"
The legitimate fears on the part of the employer that underlie such provisions are understandable. Some protection is needed against the
employee who makes an undisclosed invention in the course of his
employment and then quits his job in order to keep the benefits to himself. Protection is also needed against the use or disclosure of valuable
information which the employee receives in confidence by virtue of his
employment. Even so, it is easy to go too far in this respect, with the
result that the employee's opportunity to earn a livelihood is impaired, his
stimulus to invent is dampened, and legitimate competition is impeded."3
The third troublesome factor suggested by both of the preceding
ones is the possible adverse effect of employee contracts upon the
technological development that has become such an important public
objective. While adverse effects may flow from the non-contract common
law doctrine, these dangers become especially pressing in the contract
area to the extent that contractual provisions either lessen the incentive
of the employee to put forth his greatest effort or divert his efforts from
explorations that might serve the greatest public good. Of course, one may
discount these concerns on the premise that the employer's self-interest
may militate against any such discouragement or diversion, but we cannot
depend upon this. The interests of the employer do not always coincide
with those of the inventor and of society. Significant discoveries may die
a-borning because of the employer's lack of interest. Post-employment
restrictions may produce a blockage. And in any event the zest for putting
forth an all-out effort is quite likely to be greater if one's reward or
compensation is keyed to his achievements.
The policy considerations just mentioned do not go entirely unrecognized by the courts. The courts do sometimes call a halt to enforcement of the more extreme conditions to which employees may be subjected
by refusing, in the name of equity, to enforce them." Restrictions upon
working for competitors or otherwise turning what one has learned
against one's employer have been declared unenfidrceable in the interests
of enabling the employee to make a living and pursue the calling for which
he is trained. Excessive trailer clauses have been condemned on the ground
that they violate antitrust policy. But the efforts to harness the enthusiasm
of the employer have been modest at best. Many courts show a high degree
of tolerance to such restrictions as a result of their strong belief in
"freedom of contract." Furthermore the "in terrorem" and inhibiting effects of such contracts may be substantial. Although there appears to be no
12. O'Meara, supra note 9, at 66-72.

13. Id.
14. Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315 (1893).
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data on the subject, it is a fair assumption that for every employee who
challenges such contracts there may be many who quietly, if somewhat
unhappily, acquiesce in their terms. Finally, even when the courts do strike
down excessive restrictions, they are strongly inclined merely to reform
the contract and permit its enforcement up to the point where unreasonableness sets in. 5 In consequence, the employer has little to lose in making
excessive demands upon his employee. Even if a court does find against
him, he is free to assert whatever rights he legitimately could have
asserted in the first place.
There is a third form of allocation-or more accurately, compensation-referred to as the "ex gratia award" and its shirt-tail cousin, the
suggestion system, used by many concerns to compensate employees who
respond beyond the call of duty. 6 Such award systems, while generally
accepted and supported in theory, do not really appear to be in wide use.
Even among those concerns that do have them, they appear to operate
well within the bounds of modesty. There may well be some real possibilities in this area, but apparently these possibilities still lie largely in
the future, not in demonstrated performance.
This concludes the discussion of the rules and regulations that apply
to the private employer-employee relations. A few additional areas may be
mentioned but are of no great moment. For example, some collective
bargaining agreements exist, but most follow the common law allocation
pattern." In one area, the aircraft industry, there exist some rather
generous arrangements for sharing patent royalties, but the effect of these
arrangements may be less substantial than one might expect because of
the dampening effect the aircraft patent pool has upon patents. 8
At the statutory level, in contrast to Europe which will be discussed
shortly, there appears to be no legislation-local, state or federal--dealing
with this entire area. A few statutes affect the situation indirectly and
rather remotely. The patent laws, for instance (with some recent relaxation), require that patent applications be signed by the inventor.' A
few statutes make it a crime to disclose or otherwise appropriate trade
secrets and other confidential material.2" Some bills have been proposed in
Congress, such as the Brown bill,2' but they have made no apparent
15. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934).
16. Neumeyer, supra note 11; O'Meara, supra note 9, at 52-61.
17. See note 11 supra.
18. See note 11 supra. See also Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 646 (1964).
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (1952); U.S. PATENT OFFICE RULES OF PRACTICE.

Cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 117, 118 (1952).
20. O'Meara, supra note 9, at 5.

21. H.R. Rep. No. 5918, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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progress. The federal government has various regulations, but they have
little bearing upon the privately employed inventor.
How shall these laws and policies be evaluated? In their basic thrust,
they seem largely to reflect the prevailing concepts and economic-social
philosophies of the 19th century. A "master-servant" concept, long since
largely supplanted by modern labor relations doctrine, seems to underlie
our common-law "employed inventor" doctrine, with its.shop-rights, its
implied contracts, its obligations of servant loyalty and its insistence upon
a relationship of trust and confidence vis-A-vis the employer. A laissezfaire "freedom of contract" concept, also long-since drastically modified
in our labor relations law, underlies the broad acceptance of "contract"
as the way to resolve the cionflicting interests of employer and
employee in this area. The ex gratia award, bottomed upon employer
discretion rather than legal right, also has its roots in antiquity; however,
it may flower and flourish in modern society. As a corollary, we find
little disposition to invoke our rather complex "labor relations" concepts,
with their emphasis upon union representation, collective bargaining,
protection against unfair labor practices, and so on. Nor do we find the
governmental intrusion into such relationships such as exists elsewhere in
the employer-employee field.
The system does have its virtues. It is in tune (whether consciously
or inadvertently) with many of the realities of the modern day process
of invention and innovation. Individual inventors, although crucially
important, are not the sole element in the invention and innovation process
today and in some situations may play a less and less significant role as
the research organization and its equipment and data, the developmental
2
facilities, and the marketing processes become more and more important.
In today's highly coordinated and socialized industrial organizations,
formulation of guide-lines and emphasis upon uniform treatment may be
increasingly important to avoid misunderstandings, disagreements, the
risks of favoritism, and charges of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. In
circumstances where entrepreneurial development by the employee is
simply not feasible, one hardly can fault a system that recognizes this fact
and allocates most of the rights to one who is in a position to exploit
them. Finally, an employer whose expenditures and facilities have made
possible the creation and development of inventions that might i'therwise
not have come about should have some protection against having these
inventions turned against him as well as the affirmative right to use
them. It is to this goal that the common law doctrines and contracts are
largely directed.
22.

See note 2 supra.
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When one turns to public policy considerations, the prevailing doctrines again leave something to be desired. The generous treatment
accorded to the employer, especially in the application of contract law,
suggests that the employee may sometimes be the victim of inequitable
terms and unduly harsh conditions. The power of the employer to control
the post-employment opportunities of the employee and impede his
ability to carry on and exploit his inventive activity, lessen the utilizatk'n
of talents and ideas of the employee that we are concerned to promote.
To the extent that the law tolerates conditions that reduce the incentives
of researchers to do their level best, or divert them from more significant
activities into trivial fields, it impedes rather than promotes the progress
of science and useful arts to which we are constitutionally, politically,
economically, sociologically, financially and emotionally dedicated.
COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE

EMPLOYEE-INVENTOR POLICIES

We may now examine, somewhat more briefly, the policies of
government and other public or quasi-public institutions vis-A-vis their
employee-inventors. The policies here are, relatively speaking, somewhat
less complex and debatable. The practices are less pervasive, since the
great bulk of research and development still actually occurs at the private
sector level and, despite the fact that the government foots much of the
bill, is subject to private sector rules insofar as employees are concerned.
Looking first at the federal government, Executive Order 10096,"3
now almost twenty years in operation, expresses a general policy that is
only slightly more generous to the employee than that which prevails in
private employment. Governmental patterns in dealing with employee
rights historically largely have followed those of industry, both in the
application of common law doctrine and in developing contractual and
regulatory policies. Thus, from an early day an "employed to invent"
cioncept and a rule leaving independently-made inventions to the employee
has prevailed. The "shopright" doctrine was extended to government
employees in the Dubiliercase decided in 1933.2
Even so, variations in policy have existed in the past from department to department-a fact that should surprise no one who is familiar
with the operations of our government. Some agencies, such as the
Defense Department, were concerned mainly with the protection of their
rights to use the inventions and were content to leave the commercial
rights to the employee. Others, such as Agriculture, followed a policy iof
23. Exec. Order No. 10096, 15 C.F.R. § 389.
24. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289

U.S. 178 (1933).
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claiming all the rights in inventions made by employees in order to assure
their availability for public usage. Some of these latter agencies, however,
tended to leave foreign rights with the inventor, since the possibility of
this causing any serious impediments seemed remote in the early days.25
Concern over the lack of uniformity in government policy, and over
the use of government-supported research for private monopoly advantages, led to the promulgation in 1950 of Executive Order 10096.
Although the Department of Justice, in an extensive study that antedated
the Executive Order, made a strong pitch for broad assertion of rights by
the government, 26 the Order finally settled upon followed basically the
common law doctrine, slightly liberalized in the employee's favor. The
government showed little interest in foreign rights, especially after a
contemporaneous program for governmental foreign patenting failed to
materialize.
Notwithstanding the across-the-board reach of Executive Order
10096, there was still plenty of opportunity for diversity in administration
of the Order, in the interpretation of its language, in its application to
specific fact situations, and in simply not enforcing to the hilt the government's rights. Since mainly those decisions adverse'to the employee were
subject to review by the Government Patents Board set up by the Order,
there existed no practical restraints upon the unnecessarily generous
agency. As a result, many agencies continued to follow pretty much the
same policies that had previously been followed. On balance, though, it
seems irobable that the Order has contributed some uniformity to
government practice.
The only subsequent overall government development of significance
was the October 23, 1963, presidential proclamation relating to patent
rights.2" It was directed primarily to government contractors rather than
employees, however, and consequently has had little effect on the latter.
Three other features of the government program should be mentioned
before leaving the subject. The first is its "awards" program. Individual
agencies have had such programs for a long time, but in 1954 a general
25. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. PATENT PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY (Preliminary report on S. Res. 240 (1960)).
Cf. H. FORMAN, PATENTS: GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION 57-58 (1957).
26. 1947 ATr'Y GEN. REP. Vol. I., INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLIcIES.

27. Exec. Order No. 9865, 12 C.F.R. § 3907.

See H. FORMAN, supra note 25, at

233-37, 244-55.
28. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 28 Fed.
Reg. 10943 (1963).
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"awards" statute was passed.29 Awards under this program have been
voluminous, extending to more than 100,000 persons and totaling over
three million dollars a year. The number of awards that go for genuine
inventive contributions, however, appears to be small."0 The program is
modest, at best, when one views it against the backdrop of the entire
government operation. Set along side private industry's activities in this
field, it appears impressive.
The other two features in the government program are of a fringe
nature and call for only brief mention here. One is the provision of section
1498 of Title 28, U.S. Code, which precludes a government employee
from suing the government for patent compensation, under certain conditions, thus in effect creating an across-the-board shop-right in the
government. The other is the "no-fee" statute,3 recently repealed, waiving patent fees for government employees, subject to the government
receiving a license-a license that it may well have had anyway as a
result of the section 1498 provision just referred to. A fringe benefit
attending the "no-fee" statute has been the government's willingness to
provide legal services to the employee in getting his patent-a benefit of
much greater value than the waiver of the fees.
Viewing the government's policies overall, they appear somewhat
more generous to the employee-inventor than do many of the industry
policies. The regulations are somewhat less restrictive than the common
law rules and substantially less so than most contractual arrangements.
Many government agencies have less incentive, and consequently less
disposition, to pursue enforcement of their rights than is true of the
private profit-oriented corporation to whom possession of invention rights
means dollars in the till. The competitive injuries that may attend disclosure or adverse usage of confidential data, the risk of the employee
turning against his employer in a competitive sense, and the possibility of
the employee asserting post-employment claims to inventions he made
during employment--dangers that may be very real to the private
employer-appear remote or non-existent in the governmental environment. Consequently, the restrictions on disclosure (except where national security is involved), the ban on competitive employment, and the
imposition of trailer clauses that often hamper the private employee, are
absent at the governmental level. The concession of foreign rights is
another manifestation of this difference in interests. Perhaps the most
significant contribution is the "awards" program. Though traditionally
29. Government Employees Incentive Awards Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-763,
ch. 1208, 68 Stat. 1105.
30. F. NEUMEYER, supra note 11, at chapter on Government Employer Policy.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 266.
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modest, potentially it may hold considerable promise as a device for stimulating greater inventive effidrt. Whether, and to what extent, these
advantages balance out against various disadvantages that may attend
government employment is a matter beyond the scope of this paper.
The other major public institution calling for discussion is the
institution of higher education-the universities and colleges. With some
notable exceptions, most universities have tended in the past to wash their
hands of any responsibility for inventions made by university personnel.8 2
This is becoming less and less true today for several reasons. One, they
have heard the success stories, usually exaggerated, of those institutions
that have undertaken to administer commercially valuable inventions.
Two, they have overcome their fears regarding the administrative headaches as a result of the know-how and facilities now available for handling
these matters. Three, the increasing blend of basic and applied research
at the university level has increased the likelihood of commercially valuable
results. Four, the insistence by the federal government that institutions
receiving federal grants see to it that the government's rights in any
forthcoming inventions are protected, has compelled the universities to
concern themselves with these matters.
Policies have varied. Some universities continue to follow a hands-off
policy. Conversely, some adopt a policy of public dedication, as opposed to
patenting. Some ride herd on their personnel to the extent, and only to
the extent, necessary to assure performance of commitments to the
federal government. Some develop working arrangements with Research
Corporation, which undertakes to administer inventions developed by
university personnel." Some require assignment of rights to the university or a connected institution. Others provide for assignment on a
voluntary basis, typically setting up a connected organization to handle
the business of administering the invention.
Where the university does undertake the administration of inventions, either directly or through associated institutions or Research
Corporation, two characteristics seem to prevail. One, the public interest
receives considerable attention, usually by requiring non-exclusive licensing wherever possible and by insisting upon responsible exploitation by
the licensee. Two, the organization shares royalties on a fairly generous
basis (typically, 15 per cent of net income) with the inventor.84 Here,
again, as in the case of government employment and in contrast to much
32. See A. PALMER, PATENTS AND NONPROFIT RESEARCH (Study of S. Res. 55 of
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
33. Id. at 36-38.
34. F. NEUmEYER, supra note 11
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private employment, the employee is not burdened with restrictions on
disclosure and on subsequent employment, or with "trailer clauses"
relating to inventions completed after employment ceases. In this university picture, we also find two additional forms of stimulus of some actual
significance and even greater potential significance: giving the employee
a share in whatever returns accure from the invention and leaving to the
inventor the patent rights in inventions he makes, enabling him to exploit
these rights in whatever ways he sees fit.
There exist other public and quasi-public institutions, such as state
and local governmental bodies, foundations of various sorts, and nonprofit research organizations. With the exception of the last-named, it
does not appear that employee inventions and patents play any significant
part among these entities. As for the so-called "non-profits," they come
in so many sorts, shades and sizes as to defy generalization.
Taking the public areas generally, two policies going in opposite directions seem to exist. On the one hand, there appears a tendency, whether
conscious or inadvertent, to provide special incentives and stimuli for employees. These take the form of special awards and recognitions, of permitting employees to share in profits accruing from inventions, of leaving
rights to employees for private exploitation, and to some extent of a relatively generous application of common law doctrine-reflecting in part
absence of the competitive threats and dangers that plague the private
concerns.
On the other hand, there appears to be some tendency, in some areas,
to move more and more closely to the positions traditionally taken by
private industry. This latter approach is understandable. There is the
already cut out industry pattern to follow. There is logic and appeal in the
concept that he who supports the inventor should own and control the
inventions the inventor makes. Nevertheless, this substantial parroting of
industry policies and practices, to the extent that it exists, seems questionable and unfortunate.
It is questionable because these institutions are by nature public
policy oriented-as they should be since they are publicly supported-and
practices that may be appropriate in the promiotion of private interests are
not necessarily appropriate in the promotion of public interests. Adam
Smith and Charles Wilson notwithstanding, what is good for General
Motors is not necessarily good for the country-and what is good for the
country is not necessarily, inevitably and unequivocally good for General
Motors. More specifically, the thrusts of desirable public-oriented research
may be less in the direction of sometimes rather narrow and short-range
competitive and marketing advantages and more in the direction of
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long-range developments and social-economic contributions that our
society as a whole can profit from but is unwilling to support through
traditional commercial processes. The incentives, stimuli and directions
given to employee activity within this milieu should be framed with these
considerations in mind. Existing practices may contribute to utility,
efficiency and economy. In this respect, they are all to the good. But this,
alone, is not enough.
Furthermore, the alternatives in allocation are different in their
effect. In the case of the private employee, the issue is whether a given
share of the private profit and opportunity for private exploitation shall go
to the employer or the employee. In the case of the public employee, the
issue is whether such share or opportunity should go to the employee,
presumably for private exploitation, or to the employer to be used for the
public benefit. It is not suggested that the public interest is always best
served by the government taking all rights in the invention. Such a policy
may put a damper on both effective invention and effective innovation and
diffusion, and thus disserve rather than serve the public interest. But in
any event, it is the public interest in all its ramifications and subtleties, and
not the private interest, that should be the guide in framing the policies to
be followed. Neither a blind adherence to the Dubilier doctrine nor an unimaginative adoption of private contract approaches achieves this.
The present approach is unfortunate. Public institutions-both universities and the government-should be experimenting, researching,
testing, trying out various ways and means of accomplishing desired
objectives. Crucially important questions concerning the extent, direction,
costs and benefits of invention and innovation-and how best to achieve
our objectives-beg for answers. To what extent is the inventive effort
and its stimulation desirable? To what extent are innovative efforts and
results desirable? To what extent should inventive and innovative activity
be diverted into certain channels instead of others? What are the relative
benefits and costs, both direct and indirect, of given inventive and innovative activity? Assuming answers to these difficult questions can be found,
how can the settled-upon objectives best be achieved? Should the practices
we now follow be maintained, or should something different be tried
depending upon the field, the subject matter, the inventir, and so on?
These are crucially important questions and the answers have not yet
been found. We cannot expect industry, preoccupied as it is with other
matters, to provide the answers. But we can ask the government, and even
more so the universities, to give attention to them. Concededly, some
experimentation is going on in these areas, for example the awards programs of the government, and the royalty-sharing and relinquishment
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of patent rights by some universities. But both institutions should be
doing more. Most of all, they should be approaching these departures
from orthodoxy with wide-open and searching eyes, in a spirit of inquiry,
and with dedication to finding out what will work best and serve best to
promote the interests of all segments of our society. Unfortunately, it is a
characteristic of most educational institutions to limit their research and
experimentation to those matters formally designated for such research
and experiment and to pursue distressingly traditional, unimaginative and
pedestrian procedures in other respects, whether it be in dealing with their
customers (the students), designing and constructing their buildings,
administering their affairs, or working out their employer-employee
relationships, research and inventive employees included. The door is
wide open for experimentation at both the governmental and academic
levels.
COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN
POLICIES AND PRACTICES

The final area for discussion is the European, as contrasted to the
United States, law. 5 The most interesting of these laws, because they
depart the furthest from our own, are those found in the Scandinavian
countries and in Germany. The discussion will be limited to these. These
countries, in sharp contrast to the United States, have enacted laws
designed to protect the interests of employed inventors, in the same sense
that we in this country have enacted minimum wage laws, collective
bargaining laws, and the like.
The Swedish law, enacted in 1949 and applicable to both private and
governmental employees, defines four categories of inventions and inventors: (1) inventions by persons employed to invent, (2) inventions
developed from ideas suggested by the employee's superior (both of these
are known as "service" inventions), (3) inventions by one not employed
to invent but falling within his area of activity, and (4) inventions having
no connection with one's employment. The employee must report all
inventions made by him, including those made independently of his work
and any upon which he obtains patents within six months after employment. The employer is entitled to all the rights in inventions falling within
categories (1) and (2). He receives shop-rights under those in category
(3). Inventions falling within category (4) belong entirely to the
employee. The employer must assert his rights within four months of
notification by the employee and must pay "reasonable compensation"
35. F. NEUMEYER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYED INVENTORS IN EUROPE (Study of S. Res.
267 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on
the judiciary, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1963)).
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therefor. Compensation is determined on the basis of (a) the economic
scope and value of the invention, (b) the nature of the employee's
employment, (c) his salary level, and (d) the expenses incurred by him.
Although relationships are subject to considerable modification by mutual
agreement, the right to reasonable compensation cannot be contracted
away. Two boards, a so-called Official Board and an Industrial Abritration Board, exist with limited powers (which I will forego describing
here) to deal with disputes under this law.8"
Under Danish law, enacted in 1955 and also applicable to both
private and governmental employees, "service inventions" (inventions
made in the course of employment and relating to one's work, or "ordered"
by the employer even though not related to the employer's activity)
become the property of the employer. He must pay a reasonable compensation, however, unless otherwise provided by contract or unless the
inventor's salary is deemed to compensate him adequately. In determining compensation, consideration is given to the importance of the invention to the. employer, the condition of employment and the extent to
which employment circumstances contributed to the invention. The
regular cd'urt system is used for the settlement of disputes.87
Norwegian law contains two unique provisions: (1) provision for
"company" patents where the actual inventor cannot be ascertained and
(2) a ban on requiring assignment of inventions made more than one
year after employment terminates.88
German law, the most complex, covers not only regular patents but
also gebrauchsmustern and suggestions as well. Inventions are grouped
broadly into (a) "free" inventions, not related to the employee's work and
belonging entirely to the employee, and (b) "service" inventions which
do relate to his employment. "Service" inventions are further divided
into three groups: those falling within the "employed to invent" category,
those based upon special knowledge and information possessed by the
company and those resulting from the employee's own activities and ideas
but based upon his general knowledge of the company. Irrespective of the
category, the employee is obligated to offer his invention to the employer,
subject to the payment of compensation. The category becomes important
in determining this compensation. What constitutes proper compensation
depends upon a large number of complex and interrelated factors. Without
attempting to describe these in detail, the factors that enter into the
calculations include the following: whether the employer is acquiring the
entire rights or only limited rights, the economic usefulness of the
36. F. NEUmEYER, supra note 35, at 4-27.
37. Id. at 27-35.
38. See note 35 supra.
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invention to the employer, the employee's duties and position, i.e., whether
his invention was the result of activities over and above his ordinary
duties, and the employer's contribution in furnishing resources and
equipment, experience, information, suggestions, assistance and guidance,
and so on. On the basis of such factual data, one determines the "value"
of the invention and the "share factor" contributed by the employer and
on the basis of these makes a numerical calculation of the compensation
to be paid. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to go into the complexities of the rules for determining such "value" and the "share
factor," although obviously these determinations are crucial in calculating
the ultimate award. Strict time limits are imposed upon the employer's
offer of compensation and the employee's rejection thereof if he deems it
unsatisfactory. Controversies may be resolved either through an arbitration board located in the patent office or through court procedures."0
Various other countries, both in Europe and elsewhere, have special
provisions relating to compensation of employee-inventors." Although
numerous cases have been decided under these and comparable lawsmany of which are discussed in the aforementioned Neumeyer treatisewe have little information on how these various laws have worked in
practice.
These programs, as is clear from the foregoing summaries, reflect
basically the following pattern. They provide a statutory basis for
allocation of rights between employer and employee. They give rather
extensive rights to the employer to claim part or all of the interest in the
employee's invention. They accord to the employee a legal right to compensation if the employer does assert his claim to the invention. They set
up tribunals for settling disputes between the employer and employee, thus
assuring the latter his day in court.
Without extensive evaluation of these programs, the following is
suggested with respect to them: first, it is not at all clear to what extent
employees, private or governmental, actually fare any better under these
supposedly "protective" laws than they do under the United States
system. 4' In the countries discussed as well as in others, the purpose for
which the employee is hired, the salary he receives and so on, are taken
into consideration in determining compensation and in many cases can
lead to the conclusion that the employee is entitled to no additional compensation. Second, the whole thrust of the European law is in the direction of additional monetary award, albeit on a percentage basis, rather
39. F. NEUMEYER, sopra note 35, at 36-66.
40. See note 35 supra.
41. The alleged scientific and technical "brain drain" from other countries to the
United States suggests that employment in this country still has its attractions.

EMPLOYED INVENTOR
than any share in the invention itself. Indeed, European law appears to go
even further than United States law (although not as far as many.
contractual commitments go) with respect to the obligation of an employee
to turn his invention over to his employer.
On the other hand, these laws take a significant step that we have
thus far refrained from taking in this country. They recognize that the
employee-inventor relationship with his employer and the allocation of
rights as between them is a matter of sufficient public concern to warrant
positive legislation. This concern is based, presumably, upon both the
public interest in maintaining satisfactory working arrangements as a
matter of labor relations and the public interest in maximizing inventive
and innovative effort in the area of technological development. Whether
these European countries have legislated wisely is, perhaps, less important
than the fact that they have seen fit to legislate. One may expect these
statutes and the experience under them to come under continued close
scrutiny with an eye to seeing whether they are working well and to
providing correctives if they are not. Human society-at least our
society-seems more inclined toward critical examination of institutions
and more disposed to reform these institutions where they result from
positive legislation than where they just grow up by themselves.4 2
CONCLUSIONS

The prevailing policies and practices vis-i-vis employed inventors
have been examined and some suggestions made as to the possible virtues
and defects of these practices. We do not really know whether the policies
and practices are good or bad-or, if they contain traces of both as they
probably do, under what circumstances and to what extent they are the
one or the other. This is unfortunate. As a society that sets great store
by technological development, and which relies extensively on the employer-employee relationship to provide this development, greater efforts
should be made to get at the answers.
The first question, of course, is: What do we want? Without
debating the validity of these assumptions, the following appear to be
desirable: to achieve a continued high rate of technological development,
42. I forego comparison of the United States experience and performance and that
of the European countries in question. Broad inquiries would seem appropriate into such

matters as (1) the relative efficiency of inventive activity, (2) the effectiveness of the
stimuli and incentives that are provided, (3) the extent, direction and shape of innovative

efforts, (4) the balance between private industry and government, (5) the balance be-

tween

basic and applied research, and between
range versus the short-range usefulness of the
Such comparisons involve innumerable factors
lationship is only one, albeit, an important one,
yond the topic presently under discussion.

science and engineering, (6) the longinventions and innovations, and so on.
of which the employer-employee reand would get us into matters far be-
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necessitating both invention and innovation; to direct this development into the most useful channels, using the term "useful" very broadly; to preserve, insofar as possible, the identity, dignity and freedom of the
individuals, as individuals, who contribute to these developments, and to
accomplish these goals within the framework of a satisfactory economic,
political and social structure, whatever that may be.
Are we achieving these objectives with our present approaches? The
answer presumptively-but only presumptively-is yes. One of our articles
of faith has been that the free enterprise system, and the give-and-take of
a bargaining process centered largely in the law of contracts, will provide
us with these desirable results more effectively than will alternative
systems. Pragmatists that we are, we embrace our prevailing economic
practices, not for themselves as such, but because we believe they do the
best job for society. Perhaps they do. But the issue is too important to
leave to assumptions, especially when we recognize that many of our
modern-day economic structures, forces and values are quite different
from what they were when these theories that we live by were formulated.
In any event, traditional economic analysis and theory has never adequately come to grips with the phenomenon we are talking about here,
namely, the enlargement and improvement of the economic pie through
invention and innovation as distinguished from merely dividing up the
limited pie we already have. 3
The conclusion arrived at is obvious: we must find out more-a lot
more-about what is happening in this field, what things are working
well and what things are not, what are the alternatives and their potentialities. What is not quite so obvious is, first, what alternatives we
should be looking at and for and, second, how to go about obtaining the
information. Alternative possibilities must be explored searchingly and
objectively, even though they may be ultimately rejected as inferior to our
present ways of achieving our objectives. A harder look should be taken
at: modified private-enterprise approaches, including collective bargaining; various means of providing special incentives through voluntary
arrangements such as the expansion of awards programs; possible compulsory award programs such as exist in Europe; the possibilities of
governmental action and support of various sorts, directed not only to its
own employees, but to private employees and independents as well, and
including awards, grants, special recognitions, opportunities for training
and education, assistance in inventing, help in developing and marketing
43. Significant recent exceptions include J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY
(1958); R. NELSON, M. PECK & E. KALACHEK, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOIIIC GROWTH AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1967); J. SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIc GROWTH (1966);
R. SOLO, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1967).
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inventions, incentives for private employers to help in attaining the
objectives and ways to encourage actual entrepreneurship on the part of
the inventor so that he gets the satisfaction of not only giving birth to his
brain-child but of participating in its upbringing.
Such explorations could, and should, proceed in many fronts. There
are many places to begin, and very few starts have been made. Individual
studies and efforts can,.of course, be undertaken." But the job is too big
and too important to be left to isolated individual efforts. The employers
themselves, whether private or public institutions, should be looking at the
field intensively, both to find out what is happening and to experiment
with new approaches. The labor unions ought to be studying the subject.
Congressional committees, with their intense interest in technology,
research and related matters, should be taking a much harder look at the
situation than they presently are. Employee interests have occasionally
received attention in the halls of Congress-for instance, in the introduction of such bills as the Brown and Saltinstall bills,45 in past hearings
on "awards" proposals,46 to some extent in the examination of government research and development policies,47 and in the Hart committee inquiries into the role of invention and innovation in shaping our corporate
structures.48 But much more extensive and intensive scrutiny is called for.
Most of all, our public institutions-the federal government itself
and the universities especially-should be researching and exploring the
field, trying to find out the kinds of things referred to above, and testing
various alternatives such as have been listed to see what policies or
combinations of policies hold the greatest promise. Some of this is already
being done with their awards programs, profit-sharing programs, and
relinquishment of rights to inventors. But they should be doing more, and
doing it with a much more conscious sense of experimentation and
exploration. They have extensive ready-made research material at hand,
their own research employees and, in the case of the government, the
employees of government contractors as well.
This is the job that needs to be done. It is too important to by-pass
and too immediate to postpone. Perhaps, when we are all through we may
44. We have the legal collections by Costa and Forman and the broader studies by
Rossman, as well as excellent articles such as the one by Finnegan and Pogue. Neumeyer of Sweden is working in this area at the present time, and I have been working
with him.

45. H.R. Rep. No. 5918, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; S. Rep. No. 789, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965).
46. Hearings on) S. 2157 and H.R. 2383 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
47. Maltby, A Government Patent Policy for Employee Inventions, 21 FED. B.J.
127 (1961).
48. Hearings on S. Res. 7o before the Subcomnn. on Anti-trust and Monopoly of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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conclude again, as we have in the past, that the unseen hand of Adam
Smith is still by far the best one to have on the tiller as we steer our
perilous course through the modern-day economic shoals. But even so,
with the research team going further and further down the road, and the
legal wagon to which it is hitched still standing where it was 50 years ago,
it behooves us to check and see whether the harness can stand the strain
lest the britchin' breaks.
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